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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, personally ; 
and as Personal Representative ; 
of the Estate of THEDA E. 
SCHDLZ, 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
-vs-
LEE PULLEY, M. D. and FHP OF ] 
UTAH, dba FHP MEDICAL CENTER, ] 
OGDEN, ] 
Defendants/ 
Respondents• 
Case No. 880216 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ON APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
JHBJgPICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a timely appeal from an Order of the Second 
Judicial District Court for Weber County, Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde presiding, which granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that this medical malpractice action was 
2 
barred by the statute of limitations. (A copy of the lower 
court's decision and order is found in the Addendum at nAH.) 
Jurisdiction exists in this Court under § 78-2-2(3)(i).V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Section 78-14-4 provides that a medical malpractice 
action is barred unless the plaintiff or patient commences suit 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 
the injury. 
The issue on this appeal is whether, under the standard 
of review for the granting of summary judgment, the trial court 
was correct in holding that this matter was barred by the statute 
of limitations; that is whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff 
or plaintiff's decedent had discovered their injury more than 
two years before this action was filed. 
DETERMTMATTVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute is the two-year medical mal-
practice statute of limitations, § 78-14-4, which provides in 
pertinent part that: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
1/ All statutory citations in this brief are to the Utah Code. 
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within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers or through the use of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence 
. . . . (The complete text is found in the 
Addendum at "B".) 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Nature of Case and Disposition Below 
This is a wrongful death and survival action alleging 
medical malpractice court granted defendants' motion 
for summary judgmer lad been commenced 
more than two years after plaintiff's injury was t should have 
been discovered and that, therefore, the art ion 
B The Parties 
Plaintiff, Miche surviving daughter 
and personal representative of her deceased mother, Theda E. 
Schulz. Defendant FHP-Utah is a health maintenance organization 
with !' :K,\i 1 i t lew a In mi » lv.j Wasatch Front at which it provides 
prepaid group medical and dental care to its subscribing members. 
Defendant Lee Pulley, M. D. wir., employed b
 r" [""HI a I all r e l e v a n t 
times at FHP's Harrison Center in Ogden. 
The Claims of Negligence 
eated by D r , Pulley at FHP#s Harrison 
Center on various occasions between June 29 and August 1, 1984, 
for complaints of right shoulder and chest pain. Plaintiff 
alleges that Dr. Pulley prescribed certain medications (unspeci-
fied in the Complaint) which caused a disease known as "necro-
tizing vasculitis."2/ [Sfifi, generallyr Complaint, R-l]. On 
August 1, 1984, Mrs. Schulz was hospitalized at St. Benedict's 
Hospital in Ogden for complications arising from this disease 
and from them she died there on October 30, 1984 at the age of 
53. 
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Pulley negligently prescribed 
medications which caused the vasculitis, failed to diagnose the 
onset of the vasculitis, failed to adequately treat the vascu-
litis, and failed to obtain Mrs. Schulz's informed consent to the 
treatment that he did render. 
D. The Pacta as to the Limitations Issue 
This action was commenced on January 14, 1988. There-
fore, under § 78-14-4, it is barred if plaintiff or plaintiff's 
decedent knew, or reasonably should have known, of the legal 
2/ A rare, degenerative inflammation of the vascular system 
which can lead to a variety of complications including kidney 
failure, skin lesions, joint pain, lung failure, inflammation 
of the heart and pericardium, peripheral nerve involvement, 
encephalopathy, and gastrointestinal bleeding. K. 
isseibacher, Harrison's Principles gf internal Medicine, 
pp. 351-5? 1342-3 (9th Ed. 1980). 
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injury HI jt: before January 1 3f 1986. Defendants' position, 
and the position of the lower court, is that discovery occurred 
not later than December "i' „ l.,:nM. The undisputed facts rele-
vant to the discovery issue are these: 
1. Al 1 defendants are "health «:are providers*" as 
ile lined i1 , l'1 • 1.4- J \ I) and this Is a "malpractice action against 
health care providers" as defined in * 7 8-14-3(29). Therefore, 
the applicable stat 111,e of. 1i m • t 11 Loris is <t »H- 14-4 , f R-- 13
 JP not 
disputed by plaintiff, hence, admitted under District Court Rule 
2.8(d)]. 
The date of the alleged negligent medical care 
by defendants was between June 29 and August 1, 1984. [Comp] ai nt, 
1 5, R-2 | • ' • • • • 
3. The Complaint was filed on January 14, 1988. 
[R-l]. (Thus, the four-year statute nf repose i . i.r re I evfinf , ) 
4. In the ml ate summer" of 1984, while she was hospi-
talized at St. Benedict's Hospital, Mrs. Schulz hired an Ogden 
lawyer, James R. Hasenyager, to "Innk into I MM l.i ts surrounding 
treatment at FHP Hospital (sic)." [Hasenyager Affidavit, J5 
1 and 2, R-55]. 
5. Mr.s. ScihuLz executed a "Medical Release" for the 
release of her FHP medical records to Mr. Hasenyager on September 
20, 1984. [R-33, % 5, R- I 7; unci i Sfi "Medical 
- 6 -
Release" for Mrs. Schulz's records from FHP was signed by plain-
tiff on December 5, 1984. [R-33, 1 6, R-14; undisputed below]. 
6. Mi*. Hasenyager went ahead and gathered the medical 
records on Mrs. Schulz, as well as medical literature on vascu-
litis, "over the next few months." [Hasenyager Affidavit, J 3, 
R-55]. 
7. Mrs. Schulz died in St. Benedict's Hospital on 
October 30, 1984. [Complaint, 1 5, R-2].3/ 
8. Before Mrs. Schulz's death, Mr. Hasenyager had 
the case reviewed by a pharmacist at the Department of Pharmacy 
at the University of Utah, Ms. Susan Stephenson. [Michelle 
Deschamps Affidavit, J 4,' R-46]. Ms. Stephenson's letter of Octo-
ber 23, 1984, informed Mr. Hasenyager that vasculitis would 
rarely, if ever, be caused by the drugs at to which he had made 
inquiry. [R-49]. A copy of Ms. Stephenson's letter to Mr. 
Hasenyager was received by plaintiff before her mother's death. 
[Deschamps Affidavit, f 4, R-46]. 
9. Following the October 30, 1984 death of her mother, 
and despite the Stephenson letter, plaintiff still "felt strongly 
3/ The pertinent statute of limitations is that for medical 
malpractice actions, not that for wrongful death actions. 
Thus, the two-year period runs from the date of discovery, 
not of death. SSS., § 78-14-3(29). 
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that a competent specialist should review the records to see if 
there was any connection between the treatment given by FHP Hospi-
tal (sic) and the death of my mother." [Deschamps Affidavit, f 
5, R-46]. 
10. On December 31, 1984, Mr. Hasenyager served a 
"Notice of Intent to Commence a Lawsuit" on defendants in accord-
ance with § 78-14-8.V [R-16, 56]. 
11. The Notice of Intent stated, among other things, 
that: 
(a) The estate of Theda Schulz intended to commence 
an action for medical malpractice against FHP and Dr. 
Pulley; 
(b) The nature of the claim was that defendants 
"negligently and carelessly failed to immediately with-
draw Theda Shulz (sic) from all medications capable 
of causing vasculitis which developed and led directly 
to her death" and that the defendants "failed to im-
mediately start her on the appropriate steroid therapy"; 
and, 
4/ Service of a Notice of Intent is complete upon proper mail-
ing. § 78-14-8. 
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(c) That a "Dr. Yenchinh" (sic-Yenchick) "finally 
instructed Mrs. Shulz (sic) to cease taking all medica-
tions except Tylenol #3 when [on July 23, 1984] he 
diagnosed Mrs. Shulz (sic) as suffering front vasculitis 
caused by a drug reaction." [R-16 and 17] (A copy 
of this document is found in the Addendum at "C".) 
12. Mr. Hasenyager had another expert review the case 
in the spring of 1985, Dr. Gary Gordon, of the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Medicine. Dr. Gordon reviewed the records 
and informed Mr. Hasenyager that "there was not a cause of 
action." [Hasenyager Affidavit, f 6, R-56]. 
13. Mr. Hasenyager then told plaintiff that, in his 
opinion, there was "no case," and closed his file shortly there-
after. [Deschamps Affidavit, ] 5, R-46; Hasenyager Affidavit, 
1 7, R-56]. 
14. Plaintiff "continued to feel uneasy about the 
circumstances surrounding [her] mother's death" and "wanted a 
second opinion" and so hired her present counsel, David A. Reeve, 
at an unstated later date. [Deschamps Affidavit, 1 8, R-46]. 
15. Mr. Reeve had a Dr. Howard Ravenscraft review 
the case in the spring of 1986. Dr. Ravenscraft was of the 
opinion that, after all, defendants had been negligent in the 
treatment of Mrs. Schulz. [Ravenscraft Letter, R-51]. 
9 
16. Mr. Reeve then filed a second Notice of Intent on 
June 16, 1986 [R-20], a third one on January 13, 1987 [R-23], 
went through the prelitigation hearing panel process, and filed 
the Complaint on January 14, 1987.5/ 
17. Plaintiff now claims that she was never informed 
by Mr. Hasenyager of his December 31, 1984, Notice of Intent 
[Deschamps Affidavit, f 7, R-46] and that the first time she 
"knew" that her mother's death was caused by defendants' negli-
gence was in May 1986. [Deschamps Affidavit, 1 13, R-48]. 
SUMMARY QF ARCTfffiET 
Plaintiff, in having "strong concerns" and feelings 
of "unease" about the care rendered by defendants, by hiring an 
attorney, having that attorney hire an expert, having that 
attorney investigate the claim, and knowing of the unexplained 
and untimely death of her mother, as a matter of law had suf-
ficient knowledge to have discovered her legal injury more than 
5/ Respondents take issue with Mr. Reeve's contention that he 
filed the second Notice of Intent because he was "unaware" 
of Mr. Hasenyager's first Notice of Intent. There is no 
record evidence to support this claim. Whether successive 
notices of intent can have the effect of tolling the statute 
of limitations need not be addressed because plaintiff's 
position is that she did not discover until May 1986, within 
the two-year period, and defendants' position is that she 
did by December 31, 1984, before the second Notice. 
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two years before she commenced this action on January 14, 1988. 
Certainty through obtaining a confirming expert's opinion is 
not a precondition to discovery; inquiry knowledge will suffice. 
Even if Ms. Deschamps did not discover her legal injury 
more than two years prior to the commencement of this action, 
her first lawyer, James Hasenyager, did, as is evidenced by his 
December 31, 1984 Notice of Intent, and the knowledge of her 
lawyer is, as a matter of law, imputed to plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE IS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAgpRABLE TO PLAIMTIFT, THERE is NO GENUINE ISSUE 
ON WHETHER SHE BAP DISCOVERED HRR T.fiGAL INJURY MORE 
THAN TWO YEARS BEFORE THIS ACTION WAS COMMENCED 
Plaintiff in substance contends that she did not and 
could not know of her legal injury until she obtained a medical 
doctor's opinion that there had been negligence on the part of 
defendants. The lower court felt otherwise: "I hold that one 
discovers the legal injury when there are facts sufficient to 
show that an injury exists, its cause, and the possibility of 
negligence, and not when one finally finds an expert willing to 
testify that suspicions of negligence finally have merit." [R-
87] Thus, the issue is whether discovery of a legal injury in 
a medical malpractice action is contingent upon a plaintiff ob-
taining a favorable expert witness. 
- 11 
That requires an analysis of Foil v. Ballinger. 601 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) and its progeny. Foil, of course, held 
that the term discovery of "injury" in § 78-14-4 meant discovery 
of both the physical injury and of the negligence which caused 
the injury. That is, the two-year limitations period does not 
commence to run until the injured person knows or should know 
both that he has sustained an injury and that this injury was 
caused by negligent action. 
Our inquiry here is an epistemological one: When does 
one "know" that an injury was caused by medical malpractice? 
Is it "certainty" knowledge or is it "inquiry" knowledge? A 
spectrum of the degrees of knowledge between certainty and ignor-
ance might be defined: 
1. Upon a plaintiff's jury verdict (which could be 
assumed to validate plaintiff's expert's opinion); 
2. Upon a plaintiff obtaining an expert opinion of 
negligence, short of trial; 
3. Upon a plaintiff having enough of a "strong con-
cern" and "suspicion" of negligence to hire an attorney to in-
vestigate the possibility of negligence, obtain medical records, 
have expert reviews, and hire another attorney when the first 
withdraws; 
- 12 -
4. Upon a plaintiff having a general feeling of dis-
satisfaction about the medical care received, which dissatisfac-
tion is not yet strong enough to warrant his going to see an 
attorney; 
5. Upon a plaintiff having suffered a physical injury, 
but having no suspicion of negligence and attributing his injury 
to happenstance or unavoidability. 
Foil makes clear that the fifth and lowest degree of 
knowledge is insufficient to constitute discovery and, perhaps, 
the same can be said for the fourth. Plaintiff's position is 
that the second degree of knowledge, "obtaining an expert 
opinion," is the minimal level needed for discovery. Defendants' 
position is that the third degree, "strong suspicions of negli-
gence which lead to action19 is enough. 
The purpose behind the knowledge requirement of the 
discovery rule is to prevent the loss of a cause of action before 
a potential plaintiff has an opportunity to become aware of the 
existence of that cause of action. Foil at 147 and S£S# Reiser 
v, Lohner. 641 P.2d 93, 102-3 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J. dissent-
ing). Once the requisite level of knowledge is achieved, a plain-
tiff is granted a two-year period, subject to the statute of 
repose, to act upon that knowledge, generally by hiring an 
attorney to investigate the potential claim. That investigatory 
13 
period allows the patient an opportunity to make a reasonable 
pre-filing inquiry. However, the law does not contemplate delay 
of the commencement of this investigatory period until such time 
as plaintiff obtains a favorable expert opinion. Were that the 
case, a plaintiff could delay obtaining an expert's confirming 
opinion and the limitations period would be extended indefinitely 
by that simple device. The two-year investigatory period is 
the time when plaintiff should, among other things, pursue her 
claim by hiring an attorney and finding an expert. But the start 
of this investigatory period is not postponed until investigation 
is completed. 
In plaintiff's view, no one can "know" of a legal injury 
until they find a compliant expert witness. A lawyer can be 
hired; he can file a notice of intent; experts can be hired and 
fired; lawyers can be hired and fired; indeed, a suit can be 
filed, but there can be no "discovery11 until a patient's suspi-
cions, no matter how strong, are confirmed through expert ana-
lysis. 
This is not what "discovery" means. Decisions since 
Eoii have made clear that "inquiry" knowledge is sufficient. 
For example, in Hove v. McMaster. 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) this 
Court held that a malpractice claim was barred where a plaintiff 
was, or should have been, aware of the "possibility" of negligence 
14 
more than two years before she filed suit. 621 P.2d at 696-697. 
Ms. Hove, like plaintiff, asserted that she could not have been 
aware of her legal injury until a physician diagnosed her condi-
tion as resulting from defendant's acts. The Court rejected that 
contention: "Plaintiff could be expected to have recognized 
the possibility that the recurring discomforts were the result 
of the injection and that a proper injection would not have caused 
the alleged injury." (emphasis added) 621 P.2d at 696. See. 
alSO., Duardan v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F. Supp., 781, 783, 
n. 1 (D. Utah 1987) for an analysis of the Hsse. decision from a 
local federal court. 6/ 
While, as Appellant indicates, it is certainly true that 
Hove was before the Court on a broader standard of review, never-
theless, the significance of the case is that this Court recog-
nized the legal principle that knowledge of a possibility of 
negligence is sufficient to constitute discovery, regardless of 
the standard of review. Defendants agree that plaintiff did 
*/ Appellant's statement that "the Utah Supreme Court doesn't 
need help from a federal court to interpret its own opinions" 
[Appellant's Brief at p. 18] is inappropriate. Of course 
defendants do not contend that the decisions of the federal 
courts on matters of state law are binding upon this Court. 
However, well-reasoned opinions on Utah law from federal 
courts, while not dispositive, can be enlightening. 
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not have the possibility of negligence "confirmed11 until she 
obtained Dr. Ravenscraft's opinion in May 1986, but neither can 
plaintiff dispute that she had "strong concerns" about those 
possibilities at a much earlier date. The issue is purely a 
legal one; whether these admitted concerns about defendants' 
care, which lead to further action are enough, or whether an 
expert's confirming opinion is also necessary. 
In another local federal court decision, Haraett v. 
Limbura. 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) Judge Winder noted that: 
Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal deter-
mination of negligence is not necessary to 
start the statute of limitations. Rather 
the crucial question is whether the plaintiff 
is aware of the facts that would leave a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may 
have a cause of action against a health care 
provider (citations omitted). Those facts 
include 'the existence of an injury, its 
cause and the possibility of negligence.' 
598 F. Supp. at 155. 
Mrs. Hargett had contended that she did not discover 
the possibility of a legal injury until she consulted a lawyer. 
This, the court noted, confused "legal injury" with a legal con-
clusion of negligence. Id. at 154-155 and seer "Developments 
in Utah Law," 1980 Utah Law Rev, at 709-710: "It is unlikely 
that the court intended to make running of the statute contingent 
on the plaintiff's receipt of expert advice from either a doctor 
or lawyer; yet, the term 'legal injury' may leave the court open 
16 
to arguments that a layman could not have been aware of this 
cause of action without such advice." 
The standard was further clarified by this Court in a 
more recent decision, Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
In that case, an evenly-divided Court partially upheld a summary 
judgment entered in favor of defendant doctors on a limitations 
issue. Plaintiff, Mrs. Brower, had received a puncture in her 
right thigh during a hysterectomy. This unexplained complication 
was held to be enough, as a matter of law, to place plaintiff 
on notice that she had received a legal injury. 744 Utah 2d at 
1337.7/ That is, "inquiry* knowledge may 
be enough, at least as to serious and unexplained complications. 
It is, as Appellant points out, true that requiring 
potential plaintiffs to act upon inquiry knowledge might encourage 
malpractice suits to be commenced before confirmation of the 
suspected malpractice through expert review. That, after all, 
Appellant is likely to seize upon the reference in Brower 
on the utility of a separate limitations trial in medical 
malpractice cases as indicating that she also should have 
a trial. But surely Brower cannot be read to mean that Rule 
56 is henceforth repealed as to limitations issues in medical 
cases, that the trial remedy and the summary judgment remedy 
are equally attractive to defendants, or that there must 
always be a trial on a limitations issue, no matter how 
clear the case. 
17 
is the inevitable result of a statute of limitations. It serves 
as a compromise between the interests of defendants in having 
claims filed while evidence and memories are fresh and the in-
terests of plaintiffs in having a reasonable period of time in 
which to sue. There may be harsh results, although in this case 
it is hardly so since Mr. Hasenyager could have filed a complaint 
before his withdrawal in the spring of 1985, or at least advised 
plaintiff of the wisdom of doing so.8/ 
If this Court is of the opinion that "certainty" know-
ledge is required for discovery, then the lower court should be 
reversed, since on the facts assumed for the purposes of the 
motion for summary judgment plaintiff did not "know" for certain 
that defendants had been negligent until she obtained a favorable 
expert opinion in May 1986. If, on the other hand, this Court 
feels that "inquiry" knowledge is sufficient, then the lower 
8/ Defendants are aware of no Utah case requiring a plaintiff 
to obtain a favorable expert opinion prior to filing a com-
plaint, at the peril of violating Rule 11, although many 
health care providers would applaud such a requirement. 
Realistically, an attorney's certificate that "to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a 
reasonable inquiry" that the complaint is "well-grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law" often means merely 
that an attorney has his own suspicions regarding negligence 
after investigation, files his complaint to protect the 
limitations issue, then locates a testifying expert. 
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court's decision should be affirmed, since by December 31, 1984, 
plaintiff's decedent had been told that the vasculitis was caused 
by a "drug reaction" [R-17], that plaintiff's decedent had hired 
an attorney to investigate the claim, that this attorney did, 
in fact, investigate the claim and hire an expert pharmacist. 
Further, by that date plaintiff's mother had died from her dis-
ease, and, following the death of her mother, plaintiff had exe-
cuted another release for medical records and, thus, indicated 
her intention to continue on with the investigation even after 
the unfavorable opinion of the expert pharmacist. After her first 
attorney served his Notice of Intent on December 31, plaintiff's 
"strong concerns" about defendants' care continued and she hired 
another attorney after the first withdrew. If this is not "in-
quiry" knowledge, nothing is. 
II. 
EVEM I F PLATWPTTV matfJVrr.V WAD WOT DISCOVERED HER 
T.BC1T. TlLTqRY^jngR LAWYER HAD. AMD THAT KNOWT.KD<TK Tff 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE IMPUTED TO PLAINTIFF 
Let it be assumed that neither plaintiff nor her mother 
discovered the legal injury outside the limitations period. The 
December 4, 1984 Notice of Intent signed by James Hasenyager as 
attorney for plaintiff makes the same allegations that plain-
tiff now asserts in her Complaint. (Addendum at "C") There 
are no material differences. If plaintiff had herself signed 
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the Notice of Intent, she could hardly now claim with any plausi 
bility that she then had no "knowledge" of defendants' negli-
gence.9/ She alleges, however, Mr. Hasenyager never told her of 
the Notice of Intent and, thus, that it has no relevance on when 
she discovered her legal injury. 
Unfortunately for plaintiff, she is bound by what Mr. 
Hasenyager knew. A client, as principal, is bound by the acts 
of her attorney, as agent, within the scope of his actual 
authority, whether express or implied, or within the scope of 
his apparent authority. 5SS, RUSSSll Y. Mftrtell, 681 P.2d 1193, 
95 (Utah 1984); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc.r 696 P.2d 645, 649 
(Calif. 1985); Alt v. Krueaer. 663 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Haw. App. 
1983). Otherwise, a client could always claim that while her 
attorney might have known or done something, she did not, and 
thus she could not be bound by what her attorney knew or did. 
Further, noNotice to an attorney of matters within the scope of 
his representation is notice to his client. Haller v. Wallisr 
573 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Wash. 1978); Lanae v. Hickman. 544 P.2d 
9/ Although it would be entirely consistent with her position 
that there cannot be discovery until a favorable expert 
opinion is obtained. 
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1208, 1209 (Nev. 1976); DjcKman V, DeMoss, 660 P.2d 1 (Colo. 
App. 1982). 
Whether or not Ms. Deschamps herself had knowledge of 
her legal injury by December 31, 1984, her attorney did, and 
that knowledge is imputed to her. There is, of course, a duty 
on the part of an attorney to inform his client of material deve-
lopments in the client's affairs. SSS., Rule 1.4, Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct of the Utah state Bar (January 1, 1988) and 
Ethical Consideration 9-2 of Canon 9, Revised Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct of the Utah State Bar (effective before January 
1, 1988). If Mr. Hasenyager did not inform plaintiff of the 
Notice of Intent, it might mean that Ms. Deschamps has a remedy 
against him for his failure to do so, but it does not mean that 
his knowledge and acts are not imputed to her. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants should be af-
firmed. 
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/7& DATED this /1'~** day of October, 1988. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Stewart M. Hanson, <fr., Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
Original Signature under Rule 
27(c): 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.# Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents was served this of October, 1988, by 
depositing them in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
David E. West, Esq. 
David A. Reeve, Esq. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1300 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<rx>Mr^gr (<**+** 
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ADDENDUM 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
SECTION 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, AS AMENDED). 
"NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE A LAWSUIT," DECEMBER 31, 1984. 
"A" 
folS !?:i'.n* :tS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WBBBJ^  COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, personally, 
and as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Theda Schulz, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE PULLEY, M.D., and FHP OF 
UTAH dba FHP MEDICAL 
CENTER, OGDEN, 
Defendants* 
Defendants1 motion for summary judgment presents the 
question of whether or not this action filed on January 14, 1988, 
was filed within the time limit proscribed by Section 78-14-4. 
Theda Schulz died in late October, 1984* Prior to her 
death she had contacted Attorney James Hasenyager to investigate 
the facts surrounding her illness, later diagnosed as vasculitis. 
Following Schulz1 death, Attorney Hasenyager continued to 
investigate the matter and had the case reviewed by experts. On 
December 31, 1984, Mr. Hasenyager served a notice of intent to 
commence lawsuit on defendants on behalf of this plaintiff in 
which he alleged the same claims and theories of negligence that 
are now alleged in this complaint. Hasenyager later determined 
that the case did not have merit. Plaintiff, still being 
concerned, hired current counsel, who had other experts review 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 1100-88 
Page 2 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 1100-88 
the records, and in May of 1986, obtained the opinion of an 
expert that there was a causal relationship between the acts of 
FHP Hospital and Schulz* death. It was plaintiff's claim that it 
was this time, May of 1986, when they received a favorable 
opinion that the statute started to run. That is, they did not 
discover the injury until she found an expert willing to testify 
to negligence. 
The basic question is an interpretation of the term 
"legal injury" as used in Foil v. Ballinger. I hold that one 
discovers the legal injury when there are facts sufficient to 
show that an injury exists, its cause, and the possibility of 
negligence, and not when one finally finds an expert willing to 
testify that the suspicions of negligence finally have merit. In 
view of plaintiff's attorney, Hasenyager, filing the notice of 
intent to sue, which sets out the facts showing the existence of 
an injury, its cause, and the allegation or possibility of 
negligence, I fail to see how the commencing of the running of 
the statute could possibly be later than the date of the filing 
of that notice. It is my opinion that the latest possible date 
that the statute of limitations would commence to run would be 
December 31, 1984. It could possibly have been sooner than that 
date, but not later. It is my opinion that the statute of 
limitations in this matter had run when this action was filed and 
is, therefore, barred. 
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Ruling on Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 1100-88 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment i s granted, 
DATED t h i s a ^ d a y of A p r i l , 1988. 
RONALD 0. HIDE," Judge' ' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h i s <5D day of A p r i l , 1988, a 
t rue and c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing Ruling on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon the f o l l o w i n g : 
David E. West 
David A. Reeve 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
1300 Walker Center 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Franc is J . Carney 
SDITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 South West Temple, 7th f l o o r 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
lriJ-± 
PAULA CARR, Secre tary 
.-IT-' 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. (1356) 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581) 
SDITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
175 South West Temple 
Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, Personally, 
and as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of THEDA E. 
SCHULTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEE PULLEY, M. P. and PEP OF 
UTAH dba PHP MEDICAL CENTER, 
OGDEN, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde presiding, on April 18, 1988, for hearing on defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the ground that this action is, as a matter 
of law, barred by the applicable statute of limitations, § 78-14-
4, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). Plaintiff was represented 
by David A. Reeve, Esq.; defendant by Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
ORDER GRANTING DEPENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-1100-88 
The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
submitted on behalf of the parties, having heard the arguments of 
counsel, having entered its memorandum decision on April 22, 1988, 
and being otherwise advised in the premises, finds that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact on the limitations issue and 
for the reasons set forth in its memorandum decision grants defend-
ants1 motion, and enters judgment as follows: 
It is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that summary judgment in 
favor of defendants, Lee Pulley, M. D. and FHP-Utah and against 
plaintiff, Michelle Deschamps, individually and as the personal re-
presentative of the Estate of Theda Schultz, shall be, and hereby 
is, entered, no cause of action. 
~y day of ApiLl'J MADE AND ENTERED this •*/ uYLl 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE RONALD C^HYDE 
District Court Judge 
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"B" 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions —' Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injur}-, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider 
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body. 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left 
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs: and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and sh^ll apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law: but any action which under former law 
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of 
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 
»c» 
TO: FHP Utah 
3291 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dr. Lee Pulley 
FHP Utah 
3291 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401. 
FHP Utah 
323 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Pursuant to Section 78-14-8 Utah Code Annotated, please 
take notice that Michelle Deschamps, personal representative 
for the estate of /Theda Shulz) intends to commence a civil 
action against you for medical malpractice leading to the 
death of Theda Shulz. 
1. NATURE OF CLAIM; The above-named defendants negligently 
and carelessly failed to immediately withdraw Theda Shulz 
from all medications capable of causing vasculitis when she 
began to exhibit symptoms indicative of vasculitis which 
developed and lead directly to her death. This claim is in 
the nature of a wrongful death claim arising from medical 
malpractice. 
2. PERSONS INVOLVED: Theda Shulz, now deceased. Dr. Lee 
Pulley and FHP Utah, its agents or employees. 
3. DATE, TIMS AND PLACE OF OCCURRENCE; Ogden, Utah between 
6/29/84 and 10/30/84 when Theda Shulz died at St. Benedict's 
Hospital. 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES; June 29, 1984 Theda Shulz was given 
tice to Commence Suit 
eda Shulz 
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.'dications capable of causing the onset of vasculitis. By 
aly 9, 1984 both of her feet were swollen and had developed 
burning pain. On July 12, 1984 both feet still burned and 
he feeling was absent in the left foot. Symptoms continued 
o worsen with loss of feeling up both legs until on July 
:3, 1984 Dr. Yenchinh finally instructed Mrs. Shulz to cease 
:aking all medication except Tylenol $3 when he diagnosed 
Irs. Shulz as suffering from vasculitis caused by a drug 
reaction. 
As a result of complications arising out of the 
vasculitis Mrs. Shulz died on October 30, 1984. 
5. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT: That Dr. Lee pulley 
and FB? Utah, its agents or employees negligently and care* 
lsssij provided iredieal care and treatment to Theda Shulz in 
that they did not immediately withdraw Mrs. Shulz from all 
medications capable of causing vasculitis when she first 
began to exhibit signs of developing vasculitis and negi-
gently and carelessly failed to immediately start her on the 
appropriate steroid therapy. 
6. DAMAGES SUSTAINED: Substantial medical costs, severe 
physical and mental pain and suffering and death. Loss of 
the love, care, society, companionship and counsel of Theda 
Shulz. ^ 
